COLORADO

Constitutional Clause/Language

“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.” 
Colo. Const. art. IX, s. 2.

Major Court Decision: Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).

Result: Financing system upheld

Summary: The Colorado Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right, adopting the rationale from San Antonio v. Rodriguez.

Key Quotes:

 “Contrary to the trial court, we hold that Colorado's school finance system does not violate Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution, nor does it deny equal protection of the law to plaintiffs-appellees, or those similarly situated.”

“We also hold ...Colorado's method of capital outlay financing is constitutional and rule that this method of capital financing, whereby each local school district is governed by a limitation on its taxing authority, is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.”  Id. at 1011.

Fundamental Rights

“On its face, Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution merely mandates action by the General Assembly-it does not establish education as a fundamental right, and it does not require that the General Assembly establish a central public school finance system restricting each school district to equal expenditures per student.”  Id. at 1018.

“State Constitution does not forbid disparities in wealth, nor does it forbid persons residing in one district from taxing themselves at rate higher than persons in another district.”  Id. at 1022.

Utilizing local property taxation to partially finance state's “public schools is rationally related to effectuating local control over public schools.” Id. at 1023.

 “... Exact dollar amount per student with eye toward financing identical education for all, such are considerations and goals which properly lie within legislative domain; judicial intrusion to weigh such considerations and achieve such goals must be avoided...”  Id. at 1025.

Suspect Class

“First, the criteria for a suspect class cannot be met by a school district regardless of the merits.”

“Second, there is no distinct and insular ‘class’ of poor persons as required for equal protection analysis. Under this analysis, we define a ‘class’ as being a group marked by common attributes or characteristics. Here, however, the alleged class of ‘poor persons,’ while possibly linked by their respective income levels, have no common attribute relative to Colorado's school financing system.  The evidence does not show that poor persons in Colorado are concentrated in low-property wealth districts, or that they uniformly or consistently receive a lower quality education, or that the districts in which they reside uniformly or consistently expend less money on education.  For example, evidence at trial shows that Denver has the greatest concentration of school children from low-income families.  Yet, Denver, by comparison, is a relatively high property wealth district. Thus, it is incorrect to suggest that poor persons, as a class, receive discriminatory treatment from PSFA.”  Id. at 1021.