Education Rights Center
at Howard University School of Law
| Know Your Rights |
| Your Right to Be Heard |
| Punishments |
| Zero Tolerance |
| Limitations on Punishment |
| Infractions |
| Mississippi law |
| Federal Law Limitations |
| Bullying |
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| [Overview paragraph] |
| Contents |
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Suspension/Expulsion Review and Due Process In Mississippi, students have a constitutional right to education and to attend school.[75] Thus, a school cannot deprive a student of this right or impose on their ability to receive this education without first affording the student certain procedures and/or hearings. The more significant the punishment the more procedures the school should follow.[77] Severe deprivations like expulsion and suspension "requir[e] solemn attention to a pupil's rights."[78] |
| Separate heading? Mississippi does place some limits on total expulsion.[111]. If a school denies a disciplined student admission into an alternative education program, that student has the right to appear before a youth court.[112] The objective of the youth court system is to help every child "become a responsible, accountable and productive citizen."[114] Thus, the youth court system can enforce various education laws and hold hearings.[113] Most important, a youth court has the power to order a public school to enroll or re-enroll a compulsory-school-age child,[115] and may also order other "appropriate educational services."[116] However, a youth court will not order the enrollment or re-enrollment of a student who has been suspended or expelled for weapons possession, or for acts that are violent or endanger others.[117] |
| School Personnel - Immunity from Liability Unless they use excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, or engage in other "willful or wanton conduct,"[121] teachers and principals are not liable for punishing a student.[122] Thus, a teacher or administrator using ordinary care[123] in enforcing discipline is immune from liability.[124] Likewise, school officials are immune from liability so long as they act in good faith and without malice in fulfilling their official duties.[125] Good faith entails acting sincerely and believing in the rightness of a disciplinary action based on current constitutional principles and settled law.[126] If a parent sues a school official for actions the official took during the course of work, the local school board is obligated to provide legal counsel to defend the teacher.[127] |
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Corporal Punishment Schools in Mississippi are given the discretion to corporally punish students. So long as the corporal punishment is reasonable, it[128] is not considered negligence or child abuse.[129] Moreover, due process does not require any hearing, notice or opportunity to respond before imposing corporal punishment. It is sufficient that students can purse legal remedies after the fact. [130] However, legal remedies for corporal punishment are only available when school personnel acted maliciously or in bad faith, or in a way that amounts to "wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety.”[131] |
| References: [75] See, e.g., In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8, citing Byrd, supra note 6 (student's fundamental right to an education is guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 14). [76] Covington County, supra note 11, citing Warren County, supra note 11; Colvin, supra note 6, citing Goss, supra note 41 at 573-75. [77] Byrd, supra note 6 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 127 (1982); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)); Warren County, supra note 11 (court ruled that student had not received procedural due process); Harris v. Tate County School District, 882 F. Supp. 90, 90 (N.D. Miss., Western Div. 1995); Hinds County, supra note 14. [78] Hinds County, supra note 14, quoting Jones, supra note 11 at 973. [79] In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8, citing Byrd, supra note 6 at 240-41. [80] Jones, supra note 11 at 972 ("at a minimum, the due process clause requires notice and opportunity to be heard"). "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Hinds County, supra note 14, quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). "[A]t a minimum [the abstract words of the Due Process Clause] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Hinds County, supra note 14, citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). [81] See, e.g., Jones, supra note 11, citing Goss, supra note 41 and Warren County, supra note 11 (requirement of notice of the nature and cause of accusations applies to school boards as well as to the courts). [82] Hinds County, supra note 14. [83] Id. ("[w]hen reviewing allegations of student misconduct, the Appeals Committee and School Board must independently review the claims and evidence"). [84] Goss, supra note 41 at 581 (1975); Jones, supra note 11, citing Goss. [85] Id. [86] 767 So.2d 187 (Miss. 2000). [87] Covington County, supra note 11; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301. [88] Jones, supra note 11; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301. See also Hinds County, supra note 14 (no due process denial or substantial prejudice to student where student did not receive notice of the initial school board disciplinary meeting, but received both notice of and opportunity to be heard at appeals committee meeting). [89] Hinds County, supra note 14; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301. [90] 500 So. 2d 455 (Miss. 1986). [91] Id. However, as long as notice and opportunity are present, their requirements do not appear to be too stringent. In Covington County (supra note 11), for instance, a court ruled that a student received adequate due process rights in suspension proceedings although his school sent notice of his violation through the superintendent, rather than through the school board attorney, as required in the school handbook. The court noted that the student's mother was immediately notified of the situation, no material information was missing from the notice that was received, and both parents were present at the formal hearing and were advised of their right to have counsel present. Covington County; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301. Similarly, a court declined to find denial of procedural due process when a student was not informed of certain accusations against him or given an opportunity to confront students making accusations, in connection with expulsion proceeding, since the student appeared to have informal notice of such accusations. Jones, supra note 11; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301. [92] Jones, supra note 11, citing Keough v. Tate County Board of Education, 748 F.2d 1077, 1083 (5th Cir. 1984). [93] Jones, supra note 11. See also Covington County, supra note 11 (denial of a list of witnesses is not always a prejudicial denial of due process); Hinds County, supra note 14 (student had no due process right to adverse witness list or right to cross-examine witnesses, since school board had no subpoena power to compel student testimony). [94] Covington County, supra note 11, citing Jones, supra note 11 at 972 and Keough, supra note 92 at 1081. [95] Supra note [citation]. [96] Hinds County, supra note 14, citing Warren County, supra note 11 at 460-61 (Miss. 1986). [97] Jones, supra note 11 at 972; Keough, supra note 92 at 1083; Covington County, supra note 11, citing Jones; Hill v. Ranklin County, Miss. Sch. Dist., 843 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Hinds County, supra note 14. [98] Covington County, supra note 11 (citing Keough, supra note 92 at 1083 and Hill, supra note 97 at 1118); see also Hinds County, supra note 14, where the court identified a lack of substantial prejudice to student, considering the nature and severity of the student's drug possession, number of students who accused the student, and the student's own signed confession); Porter v. Ascension Parish School Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (student's admission of infraction); Cole By and Through Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Separate School Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (student's admission of infraction). [99] [citation] [100] See also Covington County, supra note 11. [101] Jones, supra note 11; see also Covington County, supra note 11 (citing Jones and Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 700-01 (5th Cir. 1974)). According to the court in Covington County, "hearsay testimony from a school official does not deprive a student of any due process rights." [102] Jones, supra note 11 (citing DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D.Conn. 1972); Tibbs v. Board of Education, 59 N.J. 506 (1971); Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1981); Racine Unified School District v. Thompson, 107 Wis.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1982)). But see Covington County, where court stated, "[a]bsent information that a particular student informant may be untrustworthy, school officials may ordinarily accept at face value the information they supply." Covington County, supra note 11, quoting S.C. v. State, 583 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1991). [103] Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-71. [104] Id. [105] Id. [106] Hinds County, supra note 14 (___, J., dissenting, citing Jones, supra 11 and T.B. ex rel. C.B. v. Bd. of Trs., 931 So.2d 634, 638 (Miss.Ct.App.2006)). [107] Byrd, supra note 6 ("This Court has heretofore determined that it will not interfere with school boards in the exercise of [disciplinary] discretion so long as constitutional parameters are not transgressed") (citing Shows v. Freeman, 230 So.2d 63, 64 (Miss. 1969) and McLeod v. State Ex Rel Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 474 (1929)). [108] Byrd, supra note 6. [109] Id.; 7 MS Prac. Encyclopedia MS Law § 65:213. [110] Supra [citation] [111] Under the mandate of the Mississippi Compulsory Attendance Law, see In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8. [112] In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8. [113] Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 43-21-621; 7 MS Prac. Encyclopedia MS Law § 65:211. [114] Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 43-21-103; 7 MS Prac. Encyclopedia MS Law § 65:211. [115] See, e.g., In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8. [116] Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 43-21-621; 7 MS Prac. Encyclopedia MS Law § 65:211. [117] Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-621. "The legislature did not intend for the youth courts to usurp the power of school boards in governing the reenrollment of students suspended from school ... The youth court is expressly forbidden from ordering the reenrollment of a student suspended or expelled for possessing a weapon on school grounds or "for an offense involving a threat to the safety of other persons or for the commission of a violent act." It may intervene in the re-enrollment decision only when the child has been adjudicated delinquent and the return to school and achievement of passing grades is a condition of probation." In the Interest of T.H., III, supra note 8 (McRae, J., dissenting). |