RHODE ISLAND

Constitutional Clause/Language

“The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of their rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools and public libraries, and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people
the advantages and opportunities of education and public library services.”

R.I. Const. Art. XII, s. 1.

Major Court Decision: City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I. 1995).

Result: Financing System Upheld

Summary: The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right under its constitution and that the financing system in place was rationally related to the preservation of local control.  The court also stated that education is not a “generally judicially enforceable right.”

Key Quotes:

“The historical context of article 12, section 1, both in the 1842 Constitution and in the 1986 Constitution that continued its policies, compels the conclusion that the education clause did not intend to guarantee an ‘equal, adequate, and meaningful’ education because both at the time article 12 was adopted and for decades afterward, there was no requirement that public education be provided at all in this state. Carroll, ch. IV at 145 and ch. V at 202. Actually, plaintiffs' expert testified that at the time of its adoption, article 12 was not read as requiring there be schools in every locality, scarcely a mandate for equity.”  Id. at 56. 

“The remaining language of article 12, as we noted ante, a more comprehensive or discretionary grant of power is difficult to envision. Article 12, section 1, refers to ‘all means which it [the General Assembly] may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.’  No standard or authority has been assigned to a coordinate branch of government to review the General Assembly's performance in fulfillment of its constitutional duties in this regard. The education clause leaves all such determinations to the General Assembly's broad discretion to adopt the means it deems ‘necessary and proper’ in complying with the constitutional directive.”  Id at 59.

“We are of the opinion that the General Assembly has made a sufficient and rational effort in funding education such that judicial oversight is not warranted.  We are of the opinion that the adoption of such a definition of ‘equity’ is the prerogative of the Legislature, not of the courts.  We hold that the preservation of local control is a legitimate state interest and that the current financing system is rationally related to that legitimate interest.”  Id at 62.

“The plaintiffs argued that the public school financing system violates the equal-protection clause because children in the poorer school districts do not receive as well funded an education as do children from wealthier districts. In other words, plaintiffs have alleged that their right to education has been compromised because of their districts' diminished financial ability. The United States Supreme Court has long held that the right to an education is a not a fundamental right afforded protection under the Federal Constitution, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35, education is not generally a judicially-enforceable right under article 12, section 1, of our State Constitution.  Moreover, wealth is not a suspect classification for purposes of an equal-protection analysis. Therefore, the proper standard of review by this court is minimal scrutiny.”  Id. at 61.